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1. Introduction
The scope of this contribution is to provide an overview of recent trends in
organised crime and money laundering activities in the countries of central and
eastern Europe, and to underline the contrast policies devised to prevent the
infiltration of financial systems in these countries by organised criminal groups.
However, in order to achieve a better understanding of these phenomena and to
make an evaluation of existing contrast and prevention policies, it is necessary to
adopt a wider perspective, which also comprises western Europe. Some of the
factors, in fact, which affect the development of transnational crime and the
countermeasures taken at the national and international levels, are particularly
relevant in the European continent (Adamoli 1998). The first is the globalisation of
the economy, which at the European level means the establishment of a single
market, which brings citizens and corporations from foreign countries increasingly
in contact. Related to this are the abolition of border controls between Schengen
states and the integration between western and eastern Europe through the
transition of these countries towards a market-controlled economy, which have
increased the opportunities for illicit transactions across borders (Winer 1997).
Moreover, particularly relevant when tackling the issue of money laundering are
improved communication technology (including telephone, fax and computer
networks), the explosive increase in the use of computers in business, the
development of electronic systems in the banking and other parts of the financial
sector which use wire transfers to shift enormous amounts of cash around the world
very rapidly.
All these factors combine to make borders more and more permeable, favouring
interdependence among businesses and their globalisation. Combined with the
3persisting difference and segmentation of anti-money laundering legislation at the
regional level, they contributed to a rapid increase in transnational criminal
activities, making it of increasing concern. In fact, just as legal businesses are
expanding internationally in response to the globalisation of markets, so are the
criminal enterprises seeking to develop both their structures and illicit activities at
the international level in order to gain access to new markets, taking advantage of
the discrepancies between the legal systems of countries in different parts of the
world.
These “environmental” changes, the changes in organised criminal structures
and activities and the tightening of legislation and contrast policies in general, also
had an impact on the changes in money laundering operations. In fact criminals, in
their effort to maximise opportunities for earning profit while minimising, at the
same time, the risk of being arrested and convicted, have been very quick to shift
from one activity to the other and to enter new markets. In particular, the persisting
discrepancies existing between anti-money laundering legislation in eastern
European countries coupled with, in some of them, its scarce and ineffective
implementation, have to a certain extent created a “displacement effect” which has
lead criminal groups to find there more “friendly” environments where to conduct
their illicit activities.
With a view to describing organised criminal activities, trends in money
laundering operations and contrast policies in central and eastern Europe, the
analysis has been divided into three main parts. In the first part, a brief outline will
be delineated of the most recent developments in the structure and activities
conducted at the European level by organised crime groups. The second part of the
paper is devoted to the analysis of some money laundering trends in eastern
Europe. The third and final part compares anti-money laundering legislation
enacted by the countries of eastern Europe with European Union standards,
highlighting at the same time the provisions existing in countries which have
recently enacted domestic legislation (e.g Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Romania).
2. Organised Criminal Activity in Europe1
                                                
1 This section draws from Adamoli, Di Nicola, Savona, Zoffi, 1999, pp. 37-57, and from Adamoli,
1999.
4As already mentioned, there are a number of circumstances which favour the
development of large-scale organised criminal activities in eastern Europe: for
example the privatisation of state-owned property, the reduced size of the army
(which results in a great number of surplus weapons), the new economic and
political system and the new trade routes created after the restriction on travel
(Aromaa 1998). As a consequence, the number and volume of criminal
organisations has rapidly grown, and their activities have grown increasingly
transnational.
In the international framework of organised crime, central and eastern European
criminal organisations present an increasingly serious threat because of their rapid
expansion and the large amount of illicit proceeds they produce. They are active at
the European level in a variety of profitable illicit activities, such as trafficking in
drugs, artefacts, stolen cars, arms and trafficking in women and children for the
purpose of exploiting them for prostitution. In addition to these, other forms of
organised crime linked to the transition to a market economy have rapidly
developed: tax evasion, illicit activities in the privatisation process, infiltration of
the legal economy by criminal elements, bribery, counterfeiting, extortion and,
lastly, money laundering (Savona and Adamoli 1996).
Drug trafficking is still a very flourishing and lucrative criminal activity and it
is a clear example of an illicit conduct traditionally carried out by organised
criminal groups world-wide, and whose routes have always passed through eastern
European countries, all the more since the fall of the Soviet Union. In fact, over the
years and particularly after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the number of trafficking
routes has increased.2 The Europol reports reveal that this phenomenon is
influenced not only by globalisation in general terms, but also by the migration of
people, in particularly migration for economic and political reasons.3 These report
highlight the increased role played by criminal groups of eastern European origin
in the production and distribution of drugs. There are for instance the Albanian
groups, who are carving out a significant role in the heroin trafficking especially in
                                                
2 One of the major routes recently used for heroin is the Balkan “northern” route, which goes through
Turkey, the Balkans, Hungary, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan the drugs may
take two paths. One goes through the CIS, in which case the consignment is sent through Slovakia
and Poland to Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic states. A diversion of this route
goes through Austria and the Czech Republic to Germany and Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. In the past, Turkish “heroin” was sent to Austria and Germany via Albania, Bosnia, and
Croatia, and to Poland through Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Ivanov 1999,
5). Austria, for example, has become a transit country for heroin coming from the central Asian
regions and for cocaine, as far as it is arriving from central Europe and Russia.
5some EU Member states, traditionally in the hands of Turkish groups. In Southern
Europe, in fact, Albania has replaced the traditional transit route through the former
Yugoslav republics for drug trafficking and, to some extent, for smuggling aliens
into Italy, a point of entry into Europe.
Money laundering or smuggling are frequently linked with drug trafficking.
According to leaks in the foreign intelligence services of some CIS countries,
money from Turkish drug turnover is still coming through Europe. The Balkan
routes are preferred because the warring parties in the civil wars taking place in the
former Yugoslavia always need money. And this is true for the Kosovo Albanians,
who are desperately in need of money, and there is only one way to earn it: become
a mediator for the Turkish underworld which sends drugs to Europe. Law
enforcement agencies know about how large consignments of heroin were
disguised as humanitarian aid, easily crossed several European borders, and arrived
to Russia (Ivanov 1999, 5).
Besides drug trafficking, however, in recent years a number of other crimes
have gained importance and caused social alarm because of their diffusion.
For instance, fraud in general – and, in western Europe, fraud against the
financial interests of the European Union – is an area in which organised crime
groups work on a cross-border basis. Fraud, in fact, is increasingly committed not
only by professionals in legitimate industry on the margin of their businesses, but
also by extensive organised crime networks. The existence of a budget of the
European Institutions, in fact, creates an atmosphere where a misuse of such funds
represents a very favourable opportunity for  criminals all over Europe, and it is a
burgeoning source of illegal proceeds (European Commission 1998, 10). Organised
European Union fraudsters operate more often than not on a cross-border crime
basis. While the organisational kernel is small, they need a large and experienced
network of co-operating fraudsters and legitimate entrepreneurs to carry out their
fraud schemes.4 It has recently become clear that eastern European entrepreneurs
are no longer only “receiving” documents and/or cheap goods, but are themselves
exploring the fraud options on the European market. At the end of the illegal chain,
the laundering of the proceeds from fraud becomes a necessity for criminals if they
are to be able to enjoy their illegal earnings.
                                                                                                                           
3 Interregionaal Rechercheteam Zuid-Nederland, Fenomeenonderzoek synthetische drugs, Eindhoven,
1996, as cited in Fijnaut (1998).
4 For a more detailed analysis of fraud against the budget of the European Union see Savona, 1997.
6The “threat” of the progressive expansion of organised criminal groups from
eastern and central Europe has been seen as a very relevant part of Europe’s
modern criminal history. However, it would perhaps be more advisable to speak in
terms of the “threat” represented by the increased links between criminal groups
from western Europe and those from eastern Europe. It must be noted that
organised criminal groups from western Europe, for example, have been very quick
to exploit the many opportunities for profit created by the opening of the frontiers
to eastern European countries during their transition to a market-controlled
economy.
However, it must be noted how local criminal groups in these countries have
rapidly grown and even started crossing national borders. Russia is a clear example
of this development. The role played by organised crime in the ongoing political
and economic processes in Russia is extremely significant, since every sector of the
economy seems to be at risk of criminal infiltration. According to some figures
provided by the Russian Duma for 1998 (Fituni 1998, 360), organised crime
controls over 40 per cent of private enterprises, 60 per cent of public enterprises
and 85 per cent of commercial banks.5 Not even the civil service is free from
criminal infiltration: corruption has in fact infiltrated all levels of bureaucracy, thus
creating a favourable environment for the growth of organised crime, which often
has ethnic links.6
This process of criminal fragmentation has taken place in Russia, other CIS
republics and is still happening in the states of the former Yugoslav republics. It is
important that it is closely watched, especially because of its future implications for
the European geography of organised crime. Talks with national law enforcement
agencies in many European countries, in fact, confirm for example that groups of
Russian, Polish, Czech, Romanian and former Yugoslav origin are active in Spain,
Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Austria, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands and Sweden. Besides drug trafficking, their main activities are the
export of stolen cars, alien smuggling and trafficking in human beings for sexual
exploitation.
                                                
5 RTR, «Parlamentski Clas», 25 January 1998.
6 The bound created by ethnic ties is one of the most significant features of organised criminal groups
of Russian origin. A number of ethnic groups are active both in Russia and in the other countries of
the region. Among these, the role played by the Ukrainians, often perpetrators of violent crimes and,
in some cases homicides, has recently increased. Moreover, the Georgian mafia is specialised in
burglaries and the control of gambling. But the most significant threat comes from the Chechen
organised criminal groups, who are particularly active in frauds and money laundering, and in some
cases motor vehicle theft and the collection of taxes from prospective buyers.
7Many stolen cars exported to central and eastern European countries originate in
the European Union. It is necessary to start by saying that these crimes, which are
easily executed, can be perpetrated by single individuals, and is therefore very hard
to make a distinction in data because they often include other illicit conducts such
as joyriding and insurance fraud. However, more often the trafficking in stolen cars
is an illicit conduct perpetrated by organised criminal groups. For example,
according to local press sources, in recent years car theft has become a serious
problem in Hungary. About 16,000 cars were stolen in 1996, 3,000 more than in
1995, and car theft resulted in a loss of 16 billion forint to the country. Since 1990,
the number of stolen cars in the whole of Europe has doubled, but in Hungary it
increased 20 times.7 There has been a noticeable increase in the trafficking of
stolen cars organised by, amongst others, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups.
In fact, Russia, the Baltic states and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine appear to be the
most promising markets for stolen cars (Liukkonen 1997, 16).
In Bulgaria, organised criminal groups bribe customs officers and traffic police
authorities, and ‘legalise’ cars stolen from western countries with forged
documents.8 Many car shops in Sofia have stickers in their windows announcing
that they are protected by a security or insurance firm known to have underworld
links. As a warning to rival gangs to keep clear, this practice seems the safest
option for many Bulgarians (Savona 1998).
Alien smuggling, or trafficking in human beings - whether adults, child
prostitutes, or illegal aliens destined to forced labour in workshops - is a dramatic
phenomenon. It is a business that links immigration more and more closely to
crime, and is characterised by the increasing involvement of organised criminal
groups.9 The break-up of the Soviet Union greatly increased the traffic in illegal
immigrants, not only substantially increasing migration flows between eastern and
western Europe, but also opening up numerous new routes for traffickers, mainly
from East, South and central Asia.10 Russia, together with the Baltic States and
                                                
7 Car theft serious in Hungary. In: Xinhua News Agency, April 17, 1997.
8 Three main trafficking channels have been uncovered: the ‘Vienna channel’, where stolen cars are
imported from Germany, Italy and Austria and sold wholesale to local car shops; the ‘Russian or
Moldovian channel’ which exports stolen Bulgarian cars to the former Soviet Republics; and the
‘Macedonian channel’ which deals in stolen cars from Bulgaria and exports them to Macedonia and
Albania.
9 As for 1996, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has estimated the proceeds of this
crime at the world level to be around 8 billion dollars. For more information on this topic see Paiva,
1996, pp. 381 ss. See also Savona in co-operation with Di Nicola and Da Col, 1996.
10 There are for example the Baltic routes used mainly by people from central Asia. One route
originates in the states of the former Soviet Union, from which Asians and Africans take trains
reaching the Scandinavian countries after a final sea crossing from Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania.
8other eastern European countries, together with Finland, Sweden are becoming the
new two-way-routes for illegal activities: drug trafficking and illegal alien
smuggling from Southeast Asia to the West, and car theft from Germany, the UK
and the Netherlands towards the eastern countries and Asia (IOM 1997). Two main
migration routes pass through Poland. Another passes through the Balkans starting
from Turkey and then through the Balkan States, usually with Germany as the final
destination. Through this route the smuggled migrants either cross over to Romania
and Hungary en route to Germany; or are transported through Macedonia and
Albania and then head straight for Italy, from where they may continue to Germany
or to other West European states. Another access way is not a route in the proper
sense of the term: it comprises a number of countries on the borders of West
Europe with lenient legislation on entry permits and lax police border controls:
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania are thus used as transit
countries towards Europe.11
Moreover, smuggling of nuclear material, a relatively new criminal activity
which is causing significant alarm in western Europe, may also involve eastern
European organised criminal groups. For the time being, inspection of nuclear
smuggling incidents between 1993 and 1996 allows no conclusions to be drawn as
with regard to nuclear smuggling as an emerging activity connected more with
organised crime12, than with professionals. For the moment traffickers seem to be
individual criminals, greedy freelancers, traders, adventurers or opportunists trying
to make a profit13 and looking for a demand in this market.
Analysing these illicit activities, some considerations can be drawn as regards
recent developments. A first set concerns the links which appear to be existing
between western and eastern Europe. In their operations, in fact, criminals seem to
use the same routes from eastern Europe to western Europe and vice versa. This
suggests that there are well-established routes, such as the Balkan or Baltic ones,
used by organised crime in one direction (from eastern to western Europe) to
traffic, for instance, drugs, nuclear material and human cargo, and in the opposite
direction (from western to eastern Europe) for the illicit transport of drugs and
motor vehicles (Savona 1998). Moreover, the number of transportation routes
through Europe was fairly limited for many years, but everything changed radically
                                                
11 For a more detailed analysis see Savona, 1998.
12 German Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents. Worldwide Demand for Nuclear Weapons Materials, 20
March 1996.
9with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, when new routes were
created.
Therefore, we can hypothesise the existence of established expertise in these
crimes involving collusive agreements among the criminal groups in the countries
along the trafficking routes, who co-operate in the illicit activity, or with customs
authorities.
3. Money laundering dynamics in eastern Europe14
All the above-mentioned crimes generate large amounts of illicit proceeds,
which organised criminals need to disguise by integrating them into the financial
system in order to use them freely. The global nature of the money laundering
phenomenon, in fact, has rendered geographical borders increasingly irrelevant.
Moreover, the introduction of stricter regulations against money laundering in most
western European countries, in response to the enactment of the European
Directive 91/30815 (hereinafter the Directive), has compelled money launderers to
find new and “more friendly” countries and sectors, with non-existent or weak anti-
money laundering controls or strict bank secrecy, in which to invest their illicit
proceeds (the so-called “displacement effect”). In other words, launderers tend to
move their activities where there are fewer risks for their transactions to be
scrutinised and identified as suspicious, and this is one of the reasons why
organised criminals are now directing their illicit proceeds towards countries
belonging to central and eastern Europe, to poorly regulated countries in Asia and
Africa as well as placing them in international banking and other financial centres
and offshore facilities with ineffective anti-money laundering regulations.
One of the reasons in particular which has led them to the eastern European
countries can be identified in the transition from a state-dominated to a market-
controlled economy, which involves the liberalisation of markets and the abolition
of state control in a variety of financial and economic sectors. These countries try
to develop their economic systems by attracting foreign investments, but failing to
                                                                                                                           
13 Atkinsons, R., Officials Say Contraband not a Threat. In: The Washington Post, 28 August 1998.
14 This section draws from Adamoli, Di Nicola, Savona, Zoffi, 1998, pp. 37-57, and from Adamoli,
1999.
15 Directive of the Council of European Communities on prevention of the use of the financial system
for the purpose of money laundering, n. 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991, in Official Journal of the
European Communities n. L 166/77.
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introduce the relevant monetary and legal infrastructures, which would enable them
to control the origin of the money which is invested, create the risk of exposing
their economies to “free flowing” illicit wealth (Ali 1997).
This trend has been confirmed by many international organisations active in the
fight against money laundering. According to the latest FATF report on money
laundering typologies (FATF 1999, 16-17), the countries in the region remain a
significant money laundering concern. The transition to a market economy has
provided criminals with ample opportunities to invest their illicit proceeds, while
the opening of frontiers to western Europe and the privatisation process act as
strong incentives for the investment of dirty money.
Some considerations regard the sectors of financial system that can be misused
for money laundering purposes. From the banking sector to financial non-bank
institutions, from privatised enterprises to the real estate market, these are all
potential targets for criminals.
Unlike in the European Union, where the Directive on money laundering
contains specific provisions to protect the banking system, banks in central and
eastern Europe are still widely used for money laundering because of loopholes
and, in some cases, a lack of legislative provisions. Moreover for various reasons,
among which lack of resources and training of employees, even in countries
provided with anti-money laundering legislation depositing large amounts of cash
into bank accounts for subsequent transfer is not likely to be reported to the law
enforcement, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary or Bulgaria. This makes them
an ideal choice for the initial placement of illicit funds and enables criminals to
place vast quantities of black money into these new banking systems and then to
move it to other jurisdictions, avoiding the risk of being identified.16
Because of the lack of an anti-money laundering legislation, Estonian banks
have been routinely used as a conduit for illegal proceeds flowing to and from
Russia and western countries: these funds are transferred from one bank to another
through a variety of businesses, shell companies and off-shore centres such as the
Channel Islands, Gibraltar and the Caribbean basin. Local organised criminal
groups involved in the illegal oil trade and other smuggling activities launder their
                                                
16 This is, for instance, also the case in Poland, where activities related to money laundering take the
external form of either legal financial transactions (e.g., banking operations) or legal transactions
which violate particular administrative arrangements (e.g., safety standards in the banking system), or
illegal operations forbidden by regulations and subject to economic and penal law sanctions. This also
seems to be true for Lithuania where, soon after its independence, there is evidence that attempts were
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proceeds by transferring them to commercial accounts of an apparently legitimate
company registered in a western European country. Although Estonian law
regulates traditional financial institutions such as banks, other financial institutions
still remain unregulated and offer a readily accessible means to launder money
outside the banking system (INCSR 1999). This situation, however, should
improve after the entry into force of the new law in July 1999. Like the other two
Baltic countries, Latvian banks may be facilitating the laundering of capital coming
from Russia, since Latvian legislation does not explicitly prohibit Russian
businesses and citizens from opening accounts with Latvian commercial banks.17 In
Russia too the banking system is also widely used for laundering illicit proceeds.
According to the latest information available (January 1998), about 1,450 of the
2,000 Russian commercial banks were controlled or influenced, to some extent, by
criminal groups (Fituni 1998, 366).
Some serious cases of money laundering through the banking system have been
recently discovered and investigated. In a case recently revealed by the Slovak
Finance police, other countries were also involved, namely the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Cyprus. A total sum of 1.4 billion Slovak crowns, gained through
criminal activities in Ukraine and Slovakia, was transferred to bank accounts in the
three countries.18
Banks are only one of the money-laundering mechanisms used. In Bulgaria, for
example, as the country moves towards a market economy, not only the “classic”
laundering methods have been used, but huge amounts of money are also reported
to have been laundered through participation in the privatised tourist industry, light
industry and other profitable branches, and through investment in “projects of
exclusive necessity”.19
In particular, the task of organised crime to launder their illicit proceeds has
been facilitated by the privatisation programmes and voucher privatisation
schemes. This applies for instance to Russia, where the particular conditions
existing, with a certain degree of chaos in its legislation, transparent borders and
high levels of corruption, make it a favourable environment for money laundering
operations. The authorities’ lack of control over joint ventures and other private
                                                                                                                           
made to launder millions of rubles through the banking system using forged documents sent in some
cases from Chechnya, and in others from Kazachstan.
17 Mukhina, T., Capital Flight via Latvian Banks. In: Moscow News, 3 July 1997.
18 Slovakia: World’s Finance Intelligence Units Meet in Slovakia. In: CTK News Agency, 27 May
1999.
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enterprises in Russia, as it moves toward a market economy, hinder the
Government’s ability to control such activity. The privatisation program was
carried out through vouchers (government securities called “privatisation cheques”)
issued by the government to represent the share of national wealth to be divided.
Organised criminals bought a significant amount of these vouchers, but the
authorities made very little attempt to prevent their participation in privatisation.
Moreover, the “bearer” nature of vouchers allowed a safe way for laundering dirty
money (Fituni 1998, 360 ss.).
The money laundering operations carried out by eastern European criminal
organisations often acquire a transnational dimension, involving countries in
western Europe, which to some extent explains the enormous size of capital
flowing from some countries in central And eastern Europe. There is, in fact,
evidence that very large amounts of capital have been illegally transferred to
western banks over the recent years. Off-shore centres (like Antigua, Aruba,
Cyprus and Vanuatu), but also others not traditionally considered off-shore
financial centres (like Latvia, Estonia, Moldova or Hungary) seem to be favourable
money laundering centres. After being moved to off-shore companies in one or
more of these countries, the illicit proceeds undergo a complicated process of
layering and are finally invested, quite frequently in western European countries.
4. Anti-money laundering legislation in eastern Europe20
Since the fall of the ex-Soviet bloc, countries in central and eastern Europe have
started to look at western Europe and initiated a process of progressive
harmonisation with European standards, regarding inter alia money laundering.
                                                                                                                           
19 Police Officials Interviewed on Banking Offences and Organised Crime. In: BBC Summary of
World Broadcast, 10 February 1993.
20 Some of the information provided in this section is drawn from Task Force on Organised Crime in
the Baltic Sea Region, 1999.
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A useful element, which indicates the attitude of countries in central and eastern
Europe towards money laundering, is represented by the level of implementation,
in their legislative system, of the obligations contained in the existing international
instruments. Ten of the countries in central and eastern Europe21 have Association
Agreements with the European Union.22 Therefore, the Directive 91/308 can be
used as the basis for an evaluation of the general situation in the region concerning
anti-money laundering efforts. In the various countries, however, this
harmonisation process is not uniform. In some cases, today some countries still
have not introduced comprehensive and complete anti-money laundering
legislation, such as in Poland, while in others the piece of legislation is still in a
parliamentary procedure, such as in Russia. For some countries, which have very
recently introduced anti-money laundering legislation, it is yet too early to provide
an evaluation of its effectiveness.23
In order to provide a comparative analysis of the legislative situation of the
countries in the area with relation to money laundering, the following elements will
be highlighted: the existence of the crime of money laundering, the identification
and reporting obligations for financial and credit institutions, the existence and
effectiveness of a Financial Intelligence Unit to receive and analyse the reports.
More detailed information and specific examples will be provided for those
countries which have most recently enacted anti-money laundering measures.
Article 2 of the Directive provides that money laundering shall be prohibited.
Like the 1988 UN Convention, it requires that measures be introduced to counter
the laundering of proceeds at least of drug trafficking and related offences. In
practice, however, nearly all eastern European countries have extended the
definition of money laundering to cover the laundering of the proceeds of many
other serious crimes. Russia, though still lacking specific anti-money laundering
legislation, has enacted a new criminal code which defines such illicit conduct as a
crime.24 Poland revised its anti-money laundering measures in 1998, providing for
                                                
21 They are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia; Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
22 These agreements, which are signed between the European Union and third countries,
systematically include a specific anti-money laundering clause providing for a framework of co-
operation targeted at the harmonisation, among others, of anti-money laundering legislation
comparable with European standards.
23 Some of the countries which have adopted or updated such legislation very recently, are for
instance Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and, in January 1999, Romania.
24 Money laundering (or legalisation of illicit incomes or property) is in fact criminalised in Article
174 of the Russian Criminal Code. The penal latitude is a fine of up to 100 times the amount of
minimal labour wage or imprisonment for a term up to 4 years. If the crime is committed by a group
or repeatedly, the penalty ranges from 4 to 8 years. If the crime is committed by an organised crime
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the prohibition of such illicit conduct in Article 299 of its Penal Code.25 Also in
Slovenia, a draft law is pending which aims at widening the definition of money
laundering and the list of predicate offences contained in Article 252 of the Penal
Code (Council of Europe 1997-98, 10-11).
In July 1998 the Bulgarian Parliament enacted a new anti-money laundering
act26, thus revoking the 1996 law on prevention of money laundering, which did not
criminalise money laundering and addressed primarily record-keeping and
reporting requirement, but only provided for administrative fines for violations of
its articles. Under the new law, those engaging in money laundering risk an
imprisonment of three to twelve years, a fine of up to 30 million leva and
confiscation of part or all their properties.
Also in Estonia a wide definition of money laundering has been introduced.
According to the new Money Laundering Prevention Act, which was enacted on
the 1st July, 1999, money laundering means the transformation, transfer of, or the
conduct of legal operations with assets received as the direct result of a criminally
punishable action, with the objective of concealing the illegal origin of such assets
or the beneficial owner. The penalty for such illicit conduct ranges from a fine to
ten years of imprisonment.
Also under the new Romanian legislation adopted in January 1999, money
laundering becomes a specific criminal offence, punishable by three to 12 years of
imprisonment. The legislation covers the proceeds arising from a wide range of
serious crimes including trafficking in drugs, armaments, human beings and
protected animals; illegal trade in human tissue and organs, in addition to
prostitution, fraud, kidnapping, illegal gambling, nuclear crime, the proceeds of
organised crime, fraudulent bankruptcy and robbery.27
                                                                                                                           
group, the penalty ranges from 7 to 10 years imprisonment. Besides that, money or some other
property that has been the object of money laundering should be forfeited to the State.
25 Article 299 of the Polish Penal Code defines money laundering as follows: «Someone who has
means of payment, securities or another foreign currency, property rights, property movable or
immovable originating from the profit connected with a crime committed by other person in particular
relating to producing or trading in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, robbery, counterfeiting of
money and securities, extortion or ransom or trade in weapons, ammunitions, explosive materials or
radioactive substances, accepting them, moving, transferring or taking them out of the country,
assisting in moving their ownership or possession or undertaking other activities, which may defeat or
significantly difficult assertion, hide their criminal origin or place of putting, their detection, seizure
or decision of forfeiture is liable to imprisonment from 3 months to 5 years».
26 Law on the Measures against Money Laundering, published in the State Gazette, issue 85 of 24
July 1998.
27 Romania Adopts Legislation to Combat Money Laundering. In: The East European Banker, 1
February 1999.
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The Directive applies to credit and financial institutions, as defined respectively
by Community banking legislation 28 and by the Second Banking Directive29,
including any professional financial intermediary, but Member States of the
European Union which have an anti-money laundering legislation provide for the
application of its measures also to professions and activities beyond the financial
sector. With regard to countries in central and eastern Europe, on the contrary, the
situation is not as homogeneous. In some countries, the definition of such
institutions is stricter and a series of financial intermediaries still has no obligation
to implement anti-money laundering measures. This is, for instance, the case in
Poland, whose 1997 Act of Banking Law and 1998 Directive of the Commission of
Banking Supervision provide for requirements to be applied only to the banking
sector, thus failing to protect other sectors of the economy which could potentially
be used for money laundering purposes. Recently, however, a trend is noticeable,
especially in the newly enacted legislation towards the inclusion, as institutions
subject themselves to the anti-money laundering legislation, of professions and
other operators beyond the strict financial and credit institutions. In this regard,
some of these countries seem to fall in line with the proposal of amendment of the
Directive30, which in article 2a mentions, among others, accountants, auditors, real
estate agents, notaries and other independent legal professions.31
Furthermore, in the subsequent articles the Directive introduces a number of
obligations financial and credit institutions have to abide by, concerning the
identification of customers conducting transactions and the reporting of unusual
and suspicious operations.32 Some of the countries in the region, like Hungary and
Slovenia, had already introduced this obligation in previous years. Others have
done it more recently.
In Romania, one of the countries which recently enacted anti-money laundering
legislation, the scope of the law is not limited to credit and financial institutions;
but also applies to persons involved in gambling activities, auditors, notaries,
                                                
28 Directive 77/780/EEC (OJ L 322 of 17.12.77).
29 Directive 89/6467EEC (OJ L 386 of 30.12.89).
30 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of June 1991 on prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purpose of money laundering, COM(1999) 352 final, 99/0152 (COD).
31 In Lithuania, for instance, not only financial and credit institutions, but also notaries and persons
entitled to perform notary acts, and insurance companies are required to abide by the identification
and reporting requirements.
32 This principle of “know your customer” is of fundamental importance for the prevention of money
laundering operations. The Directive requires that clients opening an account or making transactions
over a certain amount be identified, and that the records regarding such identification be kept for at
least five years after the relationship with the customer has terminated.
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lawyers and accountants. Institutions are now required to identify customers which
have effected transactions exceeding a determined threshold or where there is a
suspicion that money laundering may be involved.
These identification requirements are a necessary precondition for the
obligation to report suspicious transactions. When conducting money laundering
investigations, in fact, it is fundamental to be able to follow the “paper trail” to
identify the origin of the illicit proceeds, and this is only possible if an accurate
record of transactions is kept by financial institutions. The purpose of criminals, in
fact, is to make it difficult for the law enforcement to follow the trace of the money
by “layering” a series of transactions often involving different institutions in
different jurisdictions, with a particular preference for those which have strict bank
secrecy and confidentiality rules and for those in which reporting of suspicious
transactions is less likely. With regard to the legislative situation in eastern
European countries on this issue, all the countries which had already introduced
anti-money laundering legislation in previous years respect the reporting
requirements. The same kind of suspicious transactions reporting system has also
been introduced in the other countries which, most recently, enacted anti-money
laundering provisions.
Among these, the recent Romanian law also institutes a system of mandatory
reporting for any transaction which, by its nature, may be linked with money
laundering. In the case of cash operations, reporting is mandatory for all amounts
exceeding 10,000 Euro. A written report must be sent to the National Office for the
Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering.33
The Directive implies that an authority or authorities be designated, which
should be responsible for receiving and analysing the reports of suspicious
transactions. These bodies are sometimes referred to as Financial Intelligence
Units. However, in some countries they take different forms: some are
administrative/intermediary bodies, while others are police or judicial authorities,
or even a mixture. In central and eastern European countries the situation regarding
this issue is far from homogeneous. Some countries, such as Latvia and Lithuania,
have created Financial Intelligence Units. Others, such as Estonia will have a
central agency (the Money Laundering Information Bureau) responsible for the
receiving and analysis of suspicious transactions. In other countries, finally, there is
                                                
33 Romania Adopts Legislation to Combat Money Laundering. In: The East European Banker, 1
February 1999.
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no central agency, and suspicious transactions have to be reported to the police.
This is again the case in Poland, where several institutions are involved in the fight
against money laundering.34 The Polish Ministry of Finance is anyway drafting a
project for the creation of such a central unit, whose task would be that of
processing and analysing information regarding financial crimes in general, and
money laundering in particular. It is clear that the effectiveness of an anti-money
laundering legislation depends in relevant part on the efficiency of the work of
these central agencies, which have the task of analysing and screening the
suspicious transactions reports coming from credit and financial institutions.
As already highlighted, Russia is one of the few countries which still has no
anti-money laundering legislation. The State Duma of the Russian Federation has
adopted the draft federal law on countering the laundering of illegally acquired
profits in its third reading (even though enactment is still uncertain). This law
would provide for all the basic identification and reporting requirements which are
necessary to prevent the financial system from being infiltrated by illicit proceeds.
A first step in this direction was made in 1998, when a law “on State control over
the correspondence of large consumption expenditures to actual income received
by physical persons” was enacted. Among the assets whose licit origin is to be
controlled are: real estate, aircraft, sea and river vessels, stocks, shares and saving
certificates, cultural valuables and gold bullion. 35 Given the recent scandals
involving alleged money laundering operations in and through the country, it
would be advisable that this legislation be enacted as soon as possible.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, some considerations can be drawn from the analysis of both the
trends in criminal phenomena and of legislative developments.
As regards the criminal activities perpetrated in the region by organised
criminal groups, several factors can be seen as favouring the growing exploitation
of eastern European countries for criminal purposes. These countries have
                                                
34 These agencies are: the Polish National Bank’s General Inspectorate of Supervision, the Ministry of
Finance’s General Inspectorate of Treasury Control, the Public Prosecutor’s Offices, the police and
the State Security Office.
35 Situation on Combating the Laundering of Funds derived from Criminal Activities and Money
Laundering Legislation in Russia, presentation by the Russian Delegation at the Training Seminar on
Money Laundering in the Baltic Sea Region, Vantaa, Finland, 22-26 February 1999.
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undergone major political changes which have also involved the reorganisation of
economic systems into free markets. Both local and foreign criminal organisations
have benefited from the situation, using the opportunities offered by economic
systems to expand their traffics and to invest their illicit proceeds in the financial
system by corrupting political figures and public officials. Since the fall of
communism, at the state level in some countries local groups have acquired
significant power over illicit activities in the big cities but also started to develop
their illicit activities at the transnational level, crossing the borders of their
respective national markets. In doing so, these groups are either in competition or
build strategic alliances with foreign-organised criminal groups, who have
extended their activities to these countries.
Besides the emergence of new organised crime groups and the
internationalisation of those already existing, these countries encounter a number
of additional problems. Political instability and corruption, coupled with high
inflation and unemployment rates, facilitate the emergence of unregulated
investment markets. The privatisation programmes which allowed for the
establishment of new banking and financial institutions have also created problems
of infiltration by criminal groups in some countries. A friendly environment was
consequently created for money launderers, who have begun investing large
amounts of capital through money laundering operations.
Experience in the fight against money laundering shows that as one door closes,
launderers find their way through the window with new methods and countries
where to launder their ill-gotten gains, and this is particularly true for the countries
under consideration. The introduction of strict and effective anti-money laundering
legislation in the European Union Member States has caused what has been called
the “displacement effect”, which means that launderers have had to resort to less
effectively regulated jurisdictions where is was easier to conduct their illicit
operations. This has led to the use of eastern European countries and other
countries in transition in Asia and Africa, in addition to financial centres and off-
shore facilities.
In the attempt to fight money laundering almost all eastern European countries
have enacted measures to protect the transparency of their financial systems. What
many countries in the region are still lacking is effective implementation of these
provisions. Anti-money laundering legislation, well drafted “in the books” but
often still insufficiently implemented “in practice”, makes it in fact relatively easy
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for criminals to circumvent the fundamental identification and reporting
obligations of banks and other financial institutions. Moreover, there are very little
reliable data on reports of suspicious transactions, nor are money laundering cases
effectively prosecuted. If we combine this situation with the opportunities for
investment created in these countries by the transition period, the risk of these
countries being exploited for money laundering purposes becomes evident.
In general terms, it is possible to identify the main problems created by money
laundering in the countries of central and eastern Europe. First, the failure of
prevention strategies makes it easier, for criminal organisations, to manage the
profits of their illicit activities. Second, such failure allows criminal groups to
invest those proceeds in further criminal activities. Third, the easy use of the
financial system by launderers jeopardises both the single financial institutions and
the financial system as a whole. Finally, the accumulation of power and wealth by
organised criminal groups, made possible by money laundering operations, can
seriously place national economies and democratic systems at risk.
Therefore, a comprehensive strategy needs to be elaborated, which should focus
on a series of different but integrated approaches. Gathering information on
organised criminal groups and their activities is fundamental to devise contrast
policies. This “know your enemy” rule involves the introduction of measures such
as the establishment of specialised law enforcement agencies, special means of
investigation and witness protection programmes. Moreover, being profit the main
goal of criminal organisations, effective legislation on seizure and confiscation of
illicit proceeds will greatly increase their costs, thus making it less profitable to
commit crimes.
Controlling organised crime and money laundering is by no means easy.
Legislation is only a part of the package of measures which are necessary to control
and prevent money laundering. A number of other issues are very important: to
begin with, an environment which facilitates the integrity of the financial system,
in order to avoid that illicit proceeds infiltrate the economy through the non-
regulated investment in privatisation programmes and other sectors. Secondly, an
effective anti-corruption strategy, which can make it more difficult for criminals to
take advantage of complaisant bank employees or public officials. Thirdly, a co-
ordinated effort through an effective international co-operation on law enforcement
matters, facilitated by bilateral agreements between countries tailored to the
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specific needs and problems, can surely speed up investigation on organised crime,
often hampered by existing national borders.
All countries in Europe are aware of the existence of organised crime, money
laundering and corruption. The threats posed by them differ from country to
country, but a co-ordinated and joint action between western and eastern European
countries is essential to ensure that the most recent trends in money laundering are
effectively taken into consideration and contrasted.
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